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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AS CONSUMER ADVOCATE:
CITY OF YORK v. PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC
UTILITY COMMISSION
Adequate representation and protection of consumer interests has
recently become a matter of considerable debate.1 Special concern has
arisen when the consumer has his interests theoretically represented by
governmental agencies but those agencies seem less than energetic in
fulfilling their duty of representation.' Cries for added consumer repre-
sentation have thus become loud and insistent.
One possible, but often overlooked, source of consumer represen-
tation is an energetic Attorney General, exercising powers of public pro-
tection bestowed upon him by common law doctrines' or intervention
rights conferred by state statute. 4 In City of York v. Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission,5 an active Pennsylvania Attorney General
sought to afford the consuming public just such representation, only to
have the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deny him that right. This Com-
ment will endeavor to explore the policy considerations concerning such
Attorney General intervention and analyze the bases of the York de-
cision. Although the whole area of consumer representation is of intense
interest at the present time, this Comment will discuss only these rela-
tively narrow issues and no attempt will be made to explore generally
the area of consumer representation or the attorney general's proper
place in it.'
'See W. MAGNUSoN & J. CARPER, TE DARx Sum oF THE MARETPLAcE (1968);
Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NoTRE DM~ta LAW. 663 (1970); Leete, The Right
of Consumers to Bring Class Actions in the Federal Courts-An Analysis of Possible
Approaches, 33 U. PiTT. L. Rtv. 39 (1971); Comment, Class Actions for Consumer
Protection, 7 HARv. CIrv. RIGHTs-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 601 (1972).
2 See Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the
Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525 (1972); Gellhorn, Public Participation in Ad-
ministrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972) ; Pontz & Sheller, The Consumer Interest
-Is it Being Protected by the Public Utility Commission?, 45 TEmP. L.Q. 315 (1972);
Comment, Public Participation in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 120 U. PA. L. Rv.
702 (1972) [hereinater cited as Public Participation].
3 See, e.g., State ex rel. Olsen v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 129 Mont. 106, 283 P.2d 594
(1955).
The common law powers of the attorney general are extremely ill-defined and can
only be found through a thorough reading of the cases. See generally NATiONAL AssociA-
TiON Or ATToRNEYs GENERAL, REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTOREY GENERAL 32-61 (1971).
4 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANNr. tit. 12, § 145 (1953). For an exposition of current consumer
protection activities of attorneys general in the United States see NATioNAL. AssocIATIo
OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, REPORT ON THE OFrICE OF ATToRxEy GENERAL 395-440 (1971).
5 449 Pa. 136, 295 A.2d 825 (1972).
6 Nothing in this Comment should be taken as opposing public interest representation
by persons other than the PUC and the Attorney General. For the same reasons that the
PUC should not be allowed the sole privilege of defining the public interest, additional
representation from other sources should be welcomed. However, additional consumer
representation raises issues which Attorney General intervention does not: questions of
funding and problems of multiplicity and delay. It is hoped that experience with active
Attorney General representation will shed new light on the feasibility and desirability of
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In York, three telephone corporations applied for a certificate of
public convenience approving their proposal to merge.' The City and
County of York filed complaints opposing the application. After the
prospective merger was approved by the Public Utility Commission
(PUC), complainants appealed to the commonwealth court. There the
telephone corporations were allowed to intervene as appellees. Subse-
quently the state Attorney General petitioned the court for leave to
intervene as an appellant. This the court denied.8 York was an appeal
taken from that lower court decision.
Writing for the supreme court, Justice Roberts disposed of four
issues. First, he found that the previous standard for approval of pro-
posed mergers articulated in Northern Pennsylvania Power Co. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission9 -- that a merger should be
approved unless it was established that it would adversely affect the
public-was not in accord with clear statutory provisions which permit
the granting of the certificate only where the merger is necessary or
proper for protection of the public interest.' Second, he held that on
the particular facts of York the PUC had made an adequate finding that
the proposed merger would affirmatively benefit the public, and that
the complainants had produced no evidence of a detrimental impact.
Third, he held that one of the merging companies, in redeeming certain
mortgage bonds, had not effected a change in their terms, conditions
or date which would have required prior registration of a securities cer-
tificate." Finally, he arrived at the important conclusion which is the
subject of this Comment: that the Attorney General's petition for inter-
vention had been properly denied below. He reached that conclusion on
two separate and independent grounds: first, that the Attorney
General's right to control PUC counsel meant that intervention would
create an irreconcilable conflict of interest, and deprive the PUC of
effective assistance of counsel; second, that enactment of the Pennsyl-
vania Public Utility Code'2 impliedly repealed the preexisting statu-
tory right of intervention claimed by the Attorney General. 3
I. PossIBLE Foims OF ATTORNEY GENERAL INTERVENTION
Before examining the doctrinal bases of the York result, the twin
problems of the desirability and the legal foundation of intervention
broader consumer representation, and effectively rebut the assertion that such representa-
tion will pose an unbearable burden on utility regulation.
7 This is required by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Code, PA. STAT. ANq. tit. 66,
§ 1122(e) (Supp. 1972).
8 City of York v. Pennsylvania PUC, 3 Pa. Commw. 270, 281 A.2d 261 (1971), aff'd,
449 Pa. 136, 295 A.2d 825 (1972).
9 333 Pa. 265, 5 A.2d 133 (1939).
10 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1123 (1959).
11See id. § 1241(a).
12 PA. STAT. AwmN. tit. 66, §§ 1101-1562 (1959), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
Is See PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 12, § 145 (1953).
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merit consideration. There seems little question that the regulatory
process, whether at the federal 4 or state 5 level, is currently barraged by
suspicion and criticism. Scathing dissents which have issued from with-
in the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, with Commissioner
Louis J. Carter calling into question the basic health and good faith
of the regulatory process,' 6 cannot be lightly dismissed.
Despite the suggestion by commentators that economic theories
long adhered to by the Commission are urgently in need of reexamina-
tion,17 the Commission steadfastly has concluded that, as a tribunal, it
alone is competent-with intervention by the Attorney General only
when he can show a "vital interest"'" of the commonwealth-to weigh
public and private interests. Accordingly, it has denied even its own
counsel the opportunity to present the consumer's case.' 9
14See Public Participation, supra note 2, at 707.
' 5 See, e.g., Griswold, The Problem of Public Confidence, 43 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 253
(1972).
16 See South Pittsburgh Water Co., No. 19313 (Pa. PUC, May 24, 1972) (dissenting
opinion at 8) ("[T]his Commission assumes the posture of the Goddess of Justice, blind-
folded, with only one eye covered, and deaf, but only to the ratepayers and not to the
utility."); Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., No. 19385 (Pa. PUC, May 15, 1972) (dis-
senting opinion at 1) (The Commission "intends to do everything possible to avoid its
responsibilities as a guardian of the consumers' interest by preventing its counsel from
discharging those responsibilities.").
17See Pontz & Sheller, supra note 2. The authors suggest persuasively that such con-
cepts as rate base, rate of return, fair value, operating expenses, reparations, service, and
environment and aesthetics all require fresh analysis, and allude to the PUC's "dismal
record of failure to protect the public interest" on its own. Id. 316.
18 See Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., No. 19385, at 6 (Pa. PUC, May 15, 1972).
While it is true that In re Mellon's Estate, 347 Pa. 520, 32 A.2d 749 (1943), cited by the
PUC in support of its denial of the Attorney General's petition to intervene, stated in
dictum that the intervention statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 145 (1953), did not give
the commonwealth an absolute right to intervene however remote its interest in a case,
the Mellon court never developed a test for remoteness, and barred intervention on
grounds of laches. Moreover, municipal corporations have long been permitted to inter-
vene without meeting such rigorous tests. See No. 19385 (dissenting opinion at 3).
The PUC used other suspect rationales to deny attorney general intervention. It
relied, at one point, on City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania PUC, 153 Pa. Super. 83, 33
A.2d 641 (1943), for the proposition that intervention is appropriate only upon a showing
of need. See No. 19385 at 3. Yet there the court merely stated that the extent to which
"consumers, whose intervention is bound to impose a hampering restriction upon the
functioning of the administrative process, should be permitted to intervene is within the
sound discretion of the Commission ... " 153 Pa. Super. at 87, 33 A.2d at 642-43. That
language clearly cannot bear the weight the PUC places upon it. Multiplicity and obstruc-
tionism, though conceivably characteristic of a broad class of consumer intervenors, cannot
be attributed to the unitary and duty-bound Attorney General.
At still another juncture the PUC argued that establishment of the Pennsylvania
Bureau of Consumer Protection, see PA. STAT. ANn. tit. 71, §§ 307-1 to -6 (Supp. 1973),
supports the conclusion that the legislature opposed reduplication of effort within the
executive branch. See No. 19385 at 6. It then moved quickly to the further conclusion
that the legislature would equally reject reduplicated effort by the Attorney General. It
is true that the act in question explicitly provides that consumer counsel shall not perform
functions entrusted to the Public Utility Commission, PA. STAT. ANn. tit. 71, § 307-5
(Supp. 1973). But there is a broad difference between newly-created consumer counsel
and the time-honored office of Attorney General, with its attendant extraordinary powers.
19 See South Pittsburgh Water Co., No. 19313 (Pa. PUC, May 24, 1972) (dissenting
opinion); cf. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., No. 19385 (Pa. PUC, May 15, 1972)
(dissenting opinion at 2) ("Not in my memory has this Commission offered affirmative
evidence in a rate case in opposition to the utility's case.").
According to the PUC, the adversary system properly places consumer against utility,
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There may be some merit in the Commission's policy of self-re-
liance and resistance to outside assistance, since the fate of the Pennsyl-
vania consumer is heavily dependent upon the good faith, industry and
talent of the Commission. Intervention, after all, is only possible in the
more egregious cases given a world of limited resources. It is denied by
almost none2° that added staffing would do much for both Commission
and consumer, enabling the former to more energetically pursue its
responsibilities, and perhaps accomplishing more than could ever be
gained by the intervention of the Attorney General or the public interest
"ombudsman" that some advocate.2 Nonetheless, there seems an abso-
lute minimum of harm and vast potential good (at the least such inter-
vention would prod the PUC into fuller awareness of consumer interests
and demands) that Attorney General intervention into public utility
matters might accomplish.
2 2
This intervention may take several forms. Apart from the arguable
right to intervene on appeal-as in York-the Attorney General may
have a right to intervene before the PUC itself. These two forms of
intervention, though bottomed on the same putative statutory author-
ity,23 involve slightly different considerations.
The York conflict-of-interest rationale is inapplicable to interven-
tion before the PUC, since PUC counsel provides representation only
when there is a Commission order to defend.2' Thus this form of inter-
vention rests upon firmer doctrinal footing than appellate intervention.
As a policy matter, it may have an additional advantage. This is the op-
portunity to participate in the factfinding process, and to advance reg-
ulatory theory before the Commission. If the Attorney General is
with the only role of the PUC being that of public interest umpire. Pontz & Sheller, supra
note 2, at 348. See also City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania PUC, 182 Pa. Super. 376, 392,
126 A.2d 777, 785 (1956). But see L. ATcrcAr & V. REIamN--, OVaCMZRGO 91 (1967):
'The Public Service Commission is not a mere judicial body to act solely as
umpire between complaining consumer or the complaining investor on the one
hand, and the great public utility system on the other hand....
'The regulating commission .. .must be a tribune of the people, putting
its engineering, its accounting and its legal resources into the breach for the pur-
pose of getting the facts and doing justice to both the consumers and investors
in public utilities.'
(quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt).
2 OSee sources cited note 31 infra.
21 See, e.g., Pontz & Sheller, supra note 2: "If the ...Commission fails to meet its
responsibility as protector of the public interest, then, at the very least, a utility consumers'
counsel is required." Id. 349.
22 Intervention is almost invariably easier to support than a right to initiate a new
proceeding, for intervention merely means participation in a proceeding already begun.
Minimally affected interests may be adequately protected through participation carefully
limited by the court. And the central problem created by intervention is the disadvantage
to the forum and other parties of extended cross-examination (a problem virtually
eliminated at the appellate level, as in York). See 3 K. DAvIS, An TrLuATrva LAW
TREA'rss § 22.08 (1958).
2 3 PA. STAT. AaNN. tit. 12, § 145 (1953).
2 4 See PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 66, § 460 (1959).
25 The Attorneys General of several states, including Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
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predominantly concerned with these matters, appellate intervention-
which might take the form of an amicus brief-would be of little bene-
fit.26
If, on the other hand, the Attorney General is satisfied that the
consumer's "factual" cause is adequately represented before the PUC,
he will have no overriding need or desire to intervene there; but should
the PUC commit an error of law, and should the consumer choose to
drop the litigation, he will need to intervene at an appellate level to keep
the PUC within the bounds of law and due process by which it is theo-
retically circumscribed.
It seems undesirable to deny the Attorney General the absolute
right to intervene before either Commission or court. Although it is
certain that in some cases intervention by the Attorney General will
prove superfluous in retrospect, it would seem unwise to condition in-
tervention on a special showing of need.28 No single advocate can be
wholly adequate to represent the diffuse "public interest. ' 29 Moreover,
there may be many occasions when it is uncertain whether counsel-
even those counsel wholly adequate in their presentation to the Com-
mission-intend to press their case on appeal. And the Attorney
General's ability to intercede effectively for consumers on appeal might
be severely restricted by his nonparticipation belowY0 Clearly there will
be other occasions when the Attorney General will be unable to predict
the competence and effectiveness of consumer counsel, or to foresee
how necessary his own participation will be to protect commonwealth
interests. While, in view of understaffing problems,31 the Commission
must be sensitive to avoiding excess delay in its proceedings, Attorney
Virginia, have been allowed to appear before state regulatory agencies on behalf of the
public. While the authority for this action is often unclear (the Oklahoma Attorney
General makes such appearances solely upon the basis of his common law powers), North
Carolina and Virginia have given their Attorneys General the statutory duty so to re-
present the public interest. NATIONAL AssocIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, REPORT ON
THE OFFIcE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 413-14 (1971). For an explanation of the North
Carolina system by the North Carolina Attorney General see Morgan, The People's Ad-
vocate in the Marketplace-The Role of the North Carolina Attorney General in the
Field of Consumer Protection, 6 WAxE FOREST IN A. L. Rxv. 1 (1969).
2 6 Meaningful consumer advocacy in the agency process may never be fully realized
if an intervenor is excluded below. See Public Participation, supra note 2, at 720.
27 See Bridgewater Borough v. Pennsylvania PUC, 181 Pa. Super. 84, 101, 124 A.2d
165, 173 (1956); cf. Pennsylvania Tel. Corp. v. Pennsylvania PUC, 153 Pa. Super. 316,
33 A.2d 765 (1943). The due process requirement for PUC proceedings is essentially a
judicial creation as the legislature has specified only minimal procedural requirements for
PUC hearings. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1394 (1959).
28See notes 33-34 infra & accompanying text.
29 See Pennsylvania Ins. Dep't v. Philadelphia, 196 Pa. Super. 221, 233 n.3, 173 A.2d
811, 817-18 n.3 (1961); Public Participation, supra note 2, at 723.
3oIf no party appeals and the Attorney General does not participate below, there
will be no appeal, see PA. STAT. ArN. tit. 66, § 1431 (a) (Supp. 1973), and no opportunity
for the Attorney General to intervene. See also note 26 supra.
31 See Pontz & Sheller, supra note 2, at 343; Brief for Attorney General at 16 n.,
City of York v. Pennsylvania PUC, 449 Pa. 136, 295 A.2d 825 (1972). But see Pontz &
Sheller, supra note 2, at 348. When asked by a federal government questionnaire in 1967
if its current appropriations were adequate, the PUC responded "Yes." Id.
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General intervention creates no precedent encouraging multiplicity of
intervenors. Moreover, institutional and financial pressures as well as
ethical commitments should ensure that the Attorney General will not
abuse his "gadfly" role by obstructing Commission proceedings. Until
the seemingly small potential for abuse is shown to be damaging to
utility regulation in the commonwealth, the Attorney General should
be granted a right of intervention considerably broader than that re-
quired in any particular case. Denying him the discretion which would
flow from such a right would adversely affect his capacity to ensure
adequate protection of the public interest.32
II. THE COMMONWEALTH'S INTEREST AS Parens Patriae
Once the desirability of Attorney General intervention is es-
tablished, the question arises as to whether there exists an interest
33
which would form the basis of a complaint by the commonwealth when
no consumer lifts his voice in protest and the state qua consumer is un-
affectedV 4 Traditional parens patria3 5 theory supports the assertion of
such an interest by the state.
The doctrine of parens patriae confirms the power of the state to
protect persons under a disability or incapable of managing their own
affairs. While the doctrine usually is asserted in support of the right of
the state to take a child from depraved parents, 6 to take custody of a
delinquent child,37 or to prescribe rules and regulations for the manage-
ment of the property of infants and incompetents, 8 the United States
Supreme Court has given the doctrine broader scope. When it was
alleged that Georgia railroads had conspired illegally to fix prices, it
was held that Georgia could properly invoke the Court's original juris-
32 The PUC may itself act as a complainant. See note 57 infra. When it does, affected
consumers may be led to presume that their interest is fully represented. Where practical
difficulties are great enough, it is hardly to be expected that the consumers will be present
at hearings to see if the PUC is vigorously representing them. See, e.g., South Pittsburgh
Water Co., No. 19313 (Pa. PUC, May 24, 1972) (rate hearings held 200 miles from
affected consumers).
33Under the general intervention statute the commonwealth can only intervene in
cases in which it has an interest. PA. STAT. AN'. fit. 12, § 145 (1953) ; see note 18 supra.
Also, complainants before the PUC must have "an interest in the subject matter." PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1391 (1959). Intervenors in appeals from PUC decisions are not
required to have such an interest, although intervention is at the discretion of the court.
Id. § 1434.
34 When the commonwealth itself is a large consumer of the affected utility, even
traditional analysis requires that, as an injured party, it be able to seek redress. See 1 K.
DAvis, ADmn-TRATn= LAW TpSx.AnE § 7.02 (1958). The PUC itself quietly acknowledges
this. See text accompanying note 58 infra.
35 "Father of his country; parent of the country. . . . [T]he state, as a sovereign-
referring to the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability . .. .
BrAcy's LAw DICTIONARY 1269 (rev'd 4th ed. 1968).
3 6 See In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
3 7 See In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 P. 871 (1915) ; Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422,
114 A.2d 1 (1955).
38 See, e.g., McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1, 205 P. 917 (1922).
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dictiori in an action for injunctive relief because of its interest as parens
patriae in the welfare of its citizens.3 And in Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia,40 when a state Attorney General sought to represent public
and private natural gas users to prevent an interruption of the flow of
gas into the state, the Court observed:
This is a matter of grave public concern in which the State, as
the representative of the public, has an interest apart from that
of the individuals affected. It is not merely a remote or ethi-
cal interest but one which is immediate and recognized by
law.
41
Though Pennsylvania courts seemingly have not dealt with the
question whether the Attorney General retains these parens patriae rights
when the public interest has been entrusted to an administrative body,42
several courts in other jurisdictions have confronted similar problems.
Perhaps most nearly on point is Muench v. Public Service Commis-
sion," in which the Wisconsin court rejected the contention that the
state could not intervene through its Attorney General because public
protection had become the sole province of the Public Service Com-
mission. There, where controversy centered around the erection of a
dam, the court took note of possibly conflicting interests between those
who would benefit from the dam and those who opposed it, and con-
cluded:
To hold that the Public Service Commission should not only
decide between these conflicting interests in its judicial ca-
pacity, but also should represent the state in protecting public
rights, would make the Commission both judge and advocate
at the same time. Such a concept violates our sense of fair
play and due process which we believe administrative agencies
acting in a quasi-judicial capacity should ever observe. 4
Others courts have reasoned similarly. In Attorney General v. Trustees
of Boston Elevated Railway,4 5 a Massachusetts court concluded that,
39 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (suit under § 16 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970)).
The Supreme Court recently had occasion to consider the applicability of the parens
patriae doctrine to § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). In Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), Hawaii brought an action as parens patriae to recover
damages to its citizens due to alleged violations of the antitrust laws. The Court held
that Hawaii could not sue under § 4 for damages, even though suit would still be allowed
under § 16 for injunctive relief, because the language of the section "does not authorize
recovery for economic injuries to the sovereign interests of a State." Id. at 265.
40 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
4
1 Id. at 592.
4 2 The court in York itself did not address the parens patriae issue. Yet its very
silence may say much, for the lower court had agreed with the PUC that the PUC alone
could represent the public interest. See City of York v. Pennsylvania PUC, 3 Pa. Commw.
270, 282, 281 A.2d 261, 267 (1971).
43 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
44 Id. at 514, 53 N.W.2d at 523.
4 319 Mass. 642, 67 N.E.2d 676 (1946).
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because the Attorney General represented the public interest, he had the
power to require other public officers to perform duties which they owed
to the public. And in State ex rel. Olsen v. Public Service Commission,46
where Montana's Attorney General questioned the reasonableness of the
result of a rate proceeding, the court concluded that when the Attorney
General judged that there was good cause to believe a public service
corporation had allowed unreasonable rates, it became his common law
duty to institute proceedings by which the rights of the state, exercised
on behalf of all the people, might be preserved and vindicated. It noted,
moreover, that this was a "well-recognized power and duty of such an
officer."
14 7
III. IMPLIED REPEAL
In light of the desirability and legal justification of Attorney
General intervention in PUC cases discussed above, the two bases of
the York decision merit critical consideration. The strongest support
for the court's result is found in its conclusion that proper construction
of relevant statutes precludes intervention. But this rationale has in-
herent flaws which seem never to have been squarely faced.
First, the York court devoted little time to analyzing its conclusion
that the omission of the word "commonwealth" from the statutory list
of permissible intervenors in appeals from PUC decisions4 was fatal to
the Attorney General's petition 9 Yet clearly enough the list of inter-
46 129 Mont. 106, 283 P.2d 594 (1955).
47Id. at 116-17, 283 P.2d at 600, quoting State v. Pacific Express Co., 80 Neb. 823,
834-35, 115 N.W. 619, 623 (1908). Pacific Express had held that, even absent a state
pecuniary interest, the Attorney General could bring suit, on behalf of the public, against
an express company to enforce rate regulations which had been set by a state railway
commission. According to the court:
To hold otherwise would be to divest the state of the most efficient manner of
exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers over the instrumentalities which
it has created for its own public purposes, which we cannot believe it ever was
the intention of the makers of the organic law to do.
Id. at 835, 115 N.W. at 623.
Cf. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949). (The United States was allowed to
become both plaintiff and statutory defendant in a proceeding to set aside an ICC order.
The Court saw an anomaly in the fact that the U.S. Attorney General was on both sides
of the case, but noted that the anomaly stemmed from statutes defining the Attorney
General's duties, and asserted that Congress could not have intended to make it impossible
for the Government to press a claim which could be vindicated only by a court challenge
to an ICC order); State v. State Bd. of Equalization, 56 Mont. 413, 185 P. 708 (1919).
48 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1434 (Supp. 1973).
49 Statutory treatment in at least one other jurisdiction is considerably different. See,
e.g., Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952), in which the
applicable intervention statute provided only that "[tihe court, in its discretion, may
permit other interested persons to intervene." Wis. STAT. AxN. § 227.16(1) (Supp. 1973).
The court suggested that "tilt would have to be a highly unusual case in which it would
not be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the state the right to intervene in
review proceedings where public rights are at stake." 261 Wis. at 513, 53 N.W.2d at 523
(emphasis added).
It is critical to note that the Attorney General would not desire to qualify solely
under PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 66, § 1434 (Supp. 1973) since that section confers only eligibility
for, but not a right to, intervention. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. Yet once
it is concluded that he is within the intendment of that section, it follows that the two
statutes no longer conflict, and he can claim the right of intervention granted by PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 145 (1953).
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venors contemplates the necessity for public interest representation by
intervenors including virtually anyone in the commonwealth except its
chief law officer. Given the generosity of the statutory definitions of
"person" (including "associations other than corporations"5 ) and
"municipal corporation" (including "any public corporation, authority,
or body whatsoever created or organized under any law of this Com-
monwealth for the purpose of rendering any service similar to that
of a public utility"51), along with the existence of broad powers in the
Attorney General both at common law5" and, arguably, under statute,'
the context reasonably allows the conclusion that the commonwealth
was an intended intervenor. 4 Also, it is not unreasonable to suggest that
"persons" might include public officials exercising the inherent powers
of their offices.55
This interpretation would require granting the Attorney General's
petition to intervene in York, despite the principle that rights of appeal
and intervention are purely statutory and must be pursued strictly ac-
cording to statute.5 6 For nothing is added to the statute by this reading;
it would have been scrupulously followed in granting the petition. The
reasonableness of this reading of the statute is enhanced by the fact that
the court's reading has the inevitable effect of eliminating the com-
monwealth from the list of possible complainants before the Commis-
sion; that list is phrased in similar language. 5 Yet in Philadelphia
Suburban Water Co.,5" the PUC itself inferred that the Attorney
General could have intervened to represent the commonwealth as a
utility customer if he had done so in a timely manner.
The application of the "implied repeal" concept used by the York
court also warrants close scrutiny. The court used that theory to
deny the Attorney General's claim to a preexisting right of interven-
tion. Yet in doing so, the court ignored vital considerations.
Before considering this aspect of the court's opinion, it may be
helpful to view the broad language of the claimed statutory grant:
5 0 PA. STAT. ANNr. tit. 66, § 1102(16) (1959).
51id. § 1102(15).
52 See Commonwealth ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 A. 524 (1936).
5 3 ee PA. STAT. A-x. tit. 12, § 145 (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 294(b) (1962).
5 4 
Words used in the Public Utility Code are to have the meaning specifically ascribed
to them unless the context indicates otherwise. See PA. STAT. ANr. tit. 66, § 1102 (1959).
5 5 Such a distinction, between a public official acting in his official capacity and the
governmental body for which he acts is not unprecedented. Under the 11th amendment,
states are immune to suit by private parties without their consent. But the Supreme
Court has made a distinction between suits against a state and suits against officials of a
state where the plaintiff alleges an injury capable of being inflicted only by the state. The
latter suit is allowed by the Court while the former is held to be barred by the 11th
amendment. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
56 See, e.g., Al Zeffiro Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pennsylvania PUC, 195 Pa. Super.
214, 171 A.2d 800 (1961) ; Franke v. Johnstown Fuel Supply Co., 70 Pa. Super. 446 (1918).
57PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1391 (1959) provides: "The commission, or any person,
corporation, or municipal corporation having an interest in the subject matter, or any
public utility concerned, may complain in writing ... 21 (emphasis added).
5 8 No. 19385 (Pa. PTJC, May 15, 1972), at 5.
1973] ATTORNEY GENERAL AS CONSUMER ADVOCATE 1179
In all cases at law or in equity, in any court or before any
officers, board, commission, or other body having jurisdiction
of the matter, in which the Commonwealth or any officer
thereof may be a party, or in which the Commonwealth may
have an interest, the Commonwealth shall have the right to in-
tervene, and to appear, plead, prosecute, defend, or appeal, as
other parties litigant; but in no case shall be required to
give any bond or other security for costs or for any purpose
whatever."9
Despite the compelling public policy expressed in this statute, the York
court merely noted that the Public Utility Code creates a "'[ciompre-
hensive and exclusive system of regulation for utilities,' "6o pointed to
the maxim of statutory construction dealing with implied repeal,61 and
found the statute repealed insofar as it applied to appeals from PUC
decisions. This is troubling for two reasons. First, the very statute es-
tablishing the Public Utility Commission provided that the Attorney
General was to retain his former powers, and granted him additional,
not lesser duties.6" If, then, the York court thought that the Public
Utility Code was intended to withdraw the Attorney General's earlier
intervention rights, the conclusion ought to be based upon stronger
evidence than that relied upon by the court.
Second, the court did not closely analyze the very maxim it ap-
plied. The same statute which announces limited conditions under which
repeal may be implied also announces a presumption against such re-
peal except under those limited conditions:
Whenever a law purports to be a revision of all laws
upon a particular subject, or sets up a general or exclusive
system covering the entire subject matter of a former law and
is intended as a substitute for such former law, such law shall
be construed to repeal all former laws upon the same subject.
Whenever a general law purports to establish a uniform
and mandatory system covering a class of subjects, such law
shall be construed to repeal pre-existing local or special laws
on the same class of subjects.
In all other cases, a later law shall not be construed to
repeal an earlier law unless the two laws be irreconcilable.'
The extraordinary circumstances under which repeal may properly be
implied are not present in York. Although the Public Utility Code is a
"general or exclusive system" covering the regulation of public utilities,
it is not a general or uniform law on the subject of intervention which
59 PA. STAT. Axm. tit. 12, § 145 (1953).
60449 Pa. at 152, 295 A.2d at 834, quoting City of York v. Pennsylvania PUC, 3
Pa. Commw. 270, 286, 281 A.2d 261, 269 (1971).
61 See PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 46, § 591 (1969).
02 See PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 66, § 1344 (1959).
63 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 591 (1969).
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would repeal all preexisting laws on the same subject."4 Thus, the first
two paragraphs of the construction statute do not apply in this case
and the third paragraph must be brought into play. Implied repeal due
to the irreconcilability of two statutes is not favored by the courts65 and
they will strain to find any fair construction of a statute to avoid such
a result. 6 Given this policy against implied repeal, a court in the York
situation should adopt the interpretation of the Public Utility Code
67
suggested above which includes the Attorney General as a permissible
intervenor,6 8 or conclude that the Code was not intended to cover
commonwealth intervention rights since those rights are dealt with in
a previous comprehensive intervention statute. Either of these con-
structions of the statute would allow the court to recognize the Attorney
General's preexisting intervention right and permit the operation of
both statutes.6"
IV. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The conflict of interest problem raised by the York court is
no more compelling than its holding on implied repeal." It is impor-
tant to note at the outset that the doctrine as applied in York is no-
where clearly developed in Pennsylvania law71 and cases similar to
York have generally evoked little concern over conflict of interest out-
side of the commonwealth." Yet the York court chose to rely solely
64 For an example of a situation where a comprehensive statute was found to repeal
by implication earlier statutes on the same subject see Girard Trust Co. v. City of
Philadelphia, 336 Pa. 433, 9 A.2d 883 (1939) (comprehensive statute giving a state agency
power and authority to inspect all elevators in state impliedly repealed earlier statute
giving City of Philadelphia such power and authority inside the city).
65 See, e.g., Scott v. Bell, 344 Pa. 243, 25 A.2d 308 (1942).
66 Id.
67 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1434 (Supp. 1973).
6 8 See notes 50-55 supra & accompanying text.
69 The problem posed by two irreconcilable statutes has not been considered often in
Pennsylvania and the few existing cases offer little guidance. See In re Public Parking
Auth., 366 Pa. 10, 76 A.2d 620 (1950) (act authorizing public parking authorities and
allowing them to enter into contracts held not to impliedly repeal earlier statute requiring
separate bids for the various branches of construction work on public buildings) ; Borough
of Kingston v. Kalanosky, 155 Pa. Super. 424, 38 A.2d 393 (1944) (acts providing for
licensing of sale of alcoholic beverages held not to impliedly repeal earlier statute em-
powering boroughs to regulate and restrict the use of buildings in order to protect the
public welfare).
70 The PUC has also denied the Attorney General the opportunity to intervene before
it on the theory that he and PUC counsel would simply duplicate each others' efforts. See
Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., No. 19385 (Pa. PUC, May 15, 1972); note 18 supra.
71 The Pennsylvania Constitution is virtually silent on conflict of interest. It indicates
only that no employee or officer of the commonwealth shall be allowed an interest in
commonwealth purchases, PA. CONST. art. 3, § 22, and that a legislator with a personal
interest in a bill proposed or pending before the General Assembly shall disclose that fact
to the house of which he is a member, and abstain from voting on the bill. PA. CONST.
art. 3, § 13.
Pennsylvania statutes also have nothing to say about this particular conflict of
interest problem. See generally Administrative Code of 1929, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§§ 51-732 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
72 See United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949) (U.S. Attorney General appeared
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upon the lower court's analysis of the problem, an analysis that in turn
relied extensively upon a precedent not squarely on point. In the case
from which the York logic was borrowed, Ault v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review,7 the Attorney General was specifically
charged with a duty to represent the Unemployment Compensation
Board.74 Instead, he elected to argue the case of the claimant against
the Board in an appeal from its decision. The result was that the Board
was literally deprived of representation before the court. Judge Wood-
side, who had allowed the Attorney General to appear before him on
Ault's behalf, concluded after the fact that the Attorney General should
have acted otherwise.75 York presented an entirely different situation.
Although the Attorney General was statutorily charged, as in Ault, with
the duty of representing Pennsylvania commissions,7 the PUC had its
own statutorily-provided counsel, 77 who represented it in York with-
out regard to the Attorney General's presence in the case.
It is undeniable that to some extent a conflict of interest nonethe-
less existed due to the Attorney General's power of appointment over
PUC counsel.7 8 Yet that conflict was one inherent in the broad responsi-
bilities of the Attorney General, and was the sort of conflict resolved
routinely through the observance of statutory and ethical duties. It is
inevitable, given the requirements of the Administrative Code which
demands that the Attorney General furnish legal advice and representa-
tion to nearly every branch of state government,7" that he must at times
represent parties with conflicting interests. Were he merely a typical
private attorney, such a conflict would not likely be permitted; but be-
cause of his unique historical role 0 the Attorney General has been
granted broad discretion to meet competing demands.8 1 He routinely
on both sides of a proceeding to set aside an ICC order. The Court noted that his rep-
resentation of the government as plaintiff in no way prevented full defense of the Com-
mission's order, as the Commission and the railroads, the real parties in interest, were
authorized to interpose all proper defenses to the government's charges.); State ex rel.
Olsen v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 129 Mont. 106, 283 P.2d 594 (1955) (Attorney General
allowed to represent both sides on appeal from Commission order); Petition of Pub.
Serv. Coordinated Transp., 5 N.J. 196, 74 A.2d 580 (1950) (Attorney General allowed to
represent both sides on appeal from Board's order). See also notes 43-47 supra & accom-
panying text.
73 188 Pa. Super. 260, 146 A.2d 729 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 398 Pa. 250, 157
A.2d 375 (1960).
74
See PA. STAT. ANNe. tit. 71, § 293(b) (Supp. 1973).
75 188 Pa. Super. at 262-64 n.1, 146 A.2d at 730-31.
76PA. STAT. Am. tit. 71, §§ 51-732 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1973); see id.
§ 293(b).
77See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 460 (1959).
78 See id.
79See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 292-93 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
8OSee Commonwealth ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 A. 524 (1936);
cf. 7 AiL. Jv. 2D Attorney General § 6 (1964).
81 See PA. STAT. AmN. tit. 71, §§ 244, 291-96 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1973)
See generally 2 K. DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW TREATiSE § 13.01 (1958). Altbhu:'h
regulatory agencies have themselves been criticized for combining incompatible functions,
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fulfills his duty by appointing deputies and special counsel.
81 PUC
counsel is not among these; 3 the Attorney General's only control over
him is the power of dismissal.8 4 Thus, the effectiveness of PUC counsel
in the light of this single threat becomes the nub of the conflict of
interest issue in the instant case.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court long ago rejected the notion
that it could presume that high officials might improperly execute their
duties.8 5 Moreover, even assuming that the Attorney General would
exert an adverse influence on the quality of PUC representation as a
result of his power of dismissal, that adverse influence would exist
irrespective of his intervention in the instant proceeding. If the law can
sanction a quiet removal of PUC counsel and allow the Attorney Gen-
eral to appoint a more compliant individual to that post, it seems
unreasonable to impose an absolute ban on conflict between the PUC
and Attorney General in open court. For in court the bench may note
improper exertions of Attorney General influence and take remedial
measures to provide for effective representation.
The York court itself noted that in Pennsylvania the Attorney
General and Commission counsel may frequently find themselves on
opposite sides of the courtroom, as when the Highway Department ap-
peals from a PUC decision. It allows these conflicts because the result
is mandated by statute.8 6 Since the court's conflict of interest rule is
independent of its analysis of relevant statutory construction, it may
be observed that intervention in York-unless the court's implied repeal
analysis is adopted-is similarly mandated by statute. The sole differ-
ence between York and a typical Highway Department case8 7 would
be that appearance by the Attorney General in the latter case would be
obligatory, not discretionary. This seems a slim distinction upon which
to base so crucial a result. The slight risk that the Attorney General
they have met criticism by internal segregation of functions and powers. Davis suggests
that broad condemnation of joinder of functions within an agency or department is
unwarranted, as "the principle which opposes the combination of functions has to do
with individuals, not with large and complex organizations." Id. 172.
82 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 296 (Supp. 1973).
83 Id.; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 460 (1959).
84 See City of York v. Pennsylvania PUC, 3 Pa. Commw. 270, 285, 281 A.2d 261,
268 (1971), aff'd, 449 Pa. 136, 295 A.2d 825 (1972).
Even if it is concluded that the PUC's counsel is a deputy of the Attorney General,
it should be noted that the Attorney General is under a duty to remove from office
underlings who perform their appointed work with less than requisite diligence. See PA.
STAT. AxN. tit. 71, § 816 (1962).
85 Lane v. Commonwealth, 103 Pa. 481 (1883) ; see, e.g., Creamer v. Twelve Common
Pleas Judges, 443 Pa. 484, 281 A.2d 57 (1971). "'We cannot assume a public official will
abuse his trust, or act with a view to evade the duties of his office. The presumption is
to the contrary.'" Id. at 496, 281 A.2d at 62, quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Lafean v.
Snyder, 261 Pa. 68, 104 A. 494, 497 (1918) (citations omitted).
86 The Attorney General is required to represent almost all elements of the common-
wealth government regardless of the identity of the opposing party. See PA. STAT. AiN.
fit. 71, § 293 (Supp. 1973).
8 7 See, e.g., Department of Highways v. Pennsylvania PUC, 189 Pa. Super. 111, 149
A.2d 552 (1959).
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might abuse his power of dismissal over Commission counsel does not
justify York's circumscription of the Attorney General's function.
V. CONCLUSION
Because of the complexities of public utility regulation, it is
natural that Pennsylvania has entrusted the interests of commonwealth
utility consumers to a Public Utility Commission. Yet the PUC has not
been granted unbridled discretion. 8 It should not, therefore, be neces-
sary for the commonwealth to reform the Commission legislatively
each time its membership seems to become lethargic in discharging its
duties to the public. Since Pennsylvania's Attorney General retains his
broad duty to represent the public,"0 it is only sensible that he be allowed
to attempt to check abuse by a Commission initially established to
protect the public. As a New Jersey court observed, the Commission
is a creature of statute operating legitimately only within
definite statutory limitations. It would be an odd situation
indeed if the people, through the executive, were unable to
enforce the legislative restrictions placed upon its functions.90
In York itself, the presence of the City and County of York may have
ensured the enforcement of legislative restrictions, and adequately
protected the public. Yet the rationale emerging from York threatens to
eliminate necessary safeguards when those aggrieved by a Commis-
sion action are not a city and a county, but a scattered collection of
consumers unable to secure adequate representation. 91
The doctrinal grounds which moved the York court to this result
are by no means compelling. A holding as weighty as York's should be
supported by more rigorous logic. It must be hoped that the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court will entertain a proper challenge to York. If,
after more exacting scrutiny of York's doctrinal grounds, it concludes
that it must affirm its prior result, there will be a clear need for statutory
reform to relax the rigid and unreasonable procedures which currently
bar the door to effective representation of the public interest.
8 8 See note 27 supra.
8 9 The Pennsylvania Attorney General has all powers and duties that the law asso-
ciates with that office, PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 71, § 244 (1962), which include the representa-
tion of the public interest. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra. The Public Utility
Code was not intended to restrict those powers and duties. See text accompanying note
62 supra.
9 0 Petition of Pub. Serv. Coordinated Transp., 5 N.J. 196, 208, 74 A.2d 580, 586
(1950).
91 It cannot lightly be ignored that the Pennsylvania consumer is more thoroughly
deprived of counsel than is the Commission. When consumers, even those aware of an
unreasonable rate hike, are scattered and minimally affected, they may go unpresented.
Cf. note 1 supra. Though the Commission has suggested that consumer causes are
scrupulously protected by its counsel and staff, see Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., No.
19385 (Pa. PUC, May 15, 1972), currently the Commission does not allow its counsel to
act as an advocate for consumers. See id. (dissenting opinion at 1 n.1); note 19 supra.
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